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"Turned wrong way round, the relentless unforeseen was what we
schoolchildren studied as 'History,' harmless history, where everything
unexpected in its own time is chronicled on the page as inevitable. The terror of
the unforeseen is what the science of history hides, turning a disaster into an
epic.
I.

INTRODUCTION

As I write this Essay in mid-October 2008, the world is struggling through a
mortgage financing crisis that has grown into overall financial turmoil. Unlike
the historian analyzing the past, we do not have the benefit of a retrospective
lens, nor do we have the comfort of knowing how this story will end (hopefully
well). Rather, the markets and the legal and policy reactions change by the day
if not by the hour; the situation and the best thinking on how to navigate it will
surely shift from the time that I write this, to the time that it is published, to the
time it is read.

*

Professor of Law, New York Law School: Visiting Fellow, Lincoln Institute
of Land

Policy, Cambridge, Massachusetts. C Gerald Korngold 2008.
1. PHILIP ROTH, THE PLOT AGAINST AMERICA 113-14 (2004) (emphasis added).
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In this Essay, I will suggest some issues and questions that are emerging in
the crisis from my perspective as a real estate transactions professor and scholar
for almost thirty years. In these early days, this Essay cannot provide a complete
description of the overall problem and its ramifications. Moreover, a few things
that we have come to learn the hard way are the almost unimaginable scope of
the crisis, the interconnectedness of sectors of the economy that were not
previously considered to be interdependent, and the ongoing outbreaks of new
firestorms in particular industries and firms. When talking about the financial
crisis, commentators often resemble the proverbial blind man describing the
elephant-able to venture a hypothesis only about the small area within his
grasp. Perhaps with time, we might be able to stitch these varied and competing
descriptions into more comprehensive narratives (which will then be challenged
and rewritten).
I will address two broad issues in this Essay. The first-the regulation of
mortgage lending and markets as we go forward-is already well under debate.
Second, I will focus in greater detail on the law of mortgages in the aftermath of
the financial crisis. The questions I will discuss here may not be well known but
are important to our real estate markets and system. While mindful of the
enormity of the issues inherent in the financial crisis, the constantly shifting
terrain, and Roth's admonition on living through history,2 I will offer some
thoughts for legislators, judges, regulators, and market players on how they
might consider and resolve some aspects of the crisis.
II.

REGULATION OF MORTGAGE LENDING AND MARKETS

What was first called the subprime crisis became a meltdown in mortgage
financing and in the secondary markets for mortgages, and ultimately became a
worldwide, general financial problem.3 The story began with the making of
subprime mortgages-residential mortgage loans to borrowers who did not
qualify for a loan on usual terms under traditional underwriting and credit
standards.4 Subprime loans carried a higher interest rate than conventional
loans, presenting a profitable revenue opportunity for the mortgage lending
community.5 Federal legislation-primarily the Community Reinvestment Act

2. Id.
3. There may be differing versions of the narrative; like so much in the crisis, there are
conflicting stories based on incomplete information and differing world views.
4. See Richard D. Marsico, Subprime Lending, Predatory Lending, and the Community
Reinvestment Act Obligations of Banks, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 735, 735 (2002-2003). To
compensate for the risk of these loans, lenders typically charge higher rates of interest. See Cathy
Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL " Was Paved with Good CongressionalIntentions:
Usury Deregulationand the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 533 (2000).
5. See Mansfield, supranote 4; Marsico, supranote 4.
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(CRA)-encouraged lending to lower-income borrowers to promote home
ownership and the establishment of credit. 6 The data indicate, however, that
CRA cannot be blamed for the current subprime crisis: most subprime loans
were not made by CRA lenders (perhaps 20% were),7 and legislation passed in
1977 could not logically have suddenly caused a crisis thirty years later-if
the
8
CRA were the problem, why wasn't there a subprime crisis years ago?
In a typical scenario, subprime loans (like "prime" mortgage loans to
borrowers who qualified under traditional underwriting standards) were
originated by mortgage brokers and mortgage companies, purchased by local
banks, and sold by local banks to investment banks. Thus, the mortgage brokers,
mortgage companies, and local banks received a full return on their capital to
lend again locally and also earned income on fees paid by each purchaser of the
loan up the chain.
The investment banks then issued securities, typically bonds, representing
the right to receive certain payments under the mortgages, usually slicing the
right to receive portions of the income and principal payments into various
tranches. Investment banks had rating agencies attest to the quality of the
bonds-with the investment banks paying the rating agencies' fees-and the
investment banks then sold the bonds to investors. The investors held or traded
these mortgage-backed securities in an active market. Some investors sought to
secure the payment of the mortgage bonds and hedge their risk; as a result,
some insurance companies entered into credit-default swaps with the
bondholder that guaranteed, in return for a premium payment, that the insurance
company would pay the bond if the issuer defaulted.

6. See Sally Pittman, ARMS, but No Legs to Stand on: "Subprime" Solutions Plague the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1089, 1092-93 (2008) (citing Souphala
Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market,
88 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 31-32 (2006), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/06/01 /ChomPennCross.pdf).
7. Issue Brief, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, CRA Is Not to Blame for the Mortgage
Meltdown (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/cra-not-to-blame-for-crisis.pdf,
Daniel Gross, Are Minorities to Blame for the Subprime Mess?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 7, 2008,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/162789; Posting of Aaron Pressman to Investing Insights,
http://www.businessweek.com/investing/insights/blog/archives/2008/09/community-reinv.html
(Sept. 29, 2008). Loans not made by depository institutions (e.g., mortgage brokers and mortgage
banks) are not within the CRA. See, e.g., Marsico, supra note 4, at 738 (discussing the assessment
areas in which a given bank is evaluated for CRA compliance); John Taylor & Josh Silver, The
Community Reinvestment Act at 30: Looking Back and Looking to the Future, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 203, 210-11 (2008-2009) (same).
8. See Marsico, supra note 4; Taylor & Silver, supra note 7.
9. See generally John P. Doherty & Richard F. Hans, The Pebble and the Pool: The (Global)
Expansion of Subprime Litigation, in Thomson-West, FIRST FOCUS: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2008)
(providing an overview ofthe different kinds oflawsuits, including contractual disputes over credit
default swaps, brought by various entities against investment banks); Gretchen Morgenson, First
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During the first years of securitization, packagers could issue bonds based
on local banks' inventories of prime mortgages. These borrowers rarely
defaulted, and the bonds had low risk. As demand for mortgage-backed
securities grew, and the bundles required more mortgages, investment banks
and local banks lowered their underwriting standards for borrowers.10 Income,
credit, and employment standards were lowered significantly, and verification
requirements were reduced." Mortgage brokers committed fraud independently
and often encouraged and abetted fraud by borrowers. 12 More and more
subprime mortgages were being sold on the secondary market through
securities. 13
Still, the arrangement worked fine. Then came the mid-2000s when
borrowers began defaulting on mortgage loans.14 This occurred for a variety of
reasons: many of the latest borrowers were financially unsound and were soon
unable to make the payments;' 5 low initial teaser rates of interest (offered by the
banks on variable rate mortgages to attract borrowers) expired and were reset at
higher rates; 16 and the real estate market plateaued or even declined, so

Comes the Swap. Then It's the Knives., N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at BI (discussing litigation
between UBS and Paramax Capital over a credit default swap that signifies the riskiness of such
transactions).
10. Brooke Masters & Saskia Scholtes, Payback Time, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007 (quoting
Chairman ofthe Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke that "[tlhe recent rapid expansion ofthe subprime
market was clearly accompanied by deterioration in underwriting standards"). There is evidence
that the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) played a limited role in the weakened underwriting
standards, with the impetus largely coming from private lending sources. David Goldstein & Kevin
G. Hall, Private Sector Loans, Not Fannie or Freddie, Triggered Crisis, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS, Oct. 12, 2008, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/story/53802.html. The U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has been criticized for itsrole in the
subprime problem. See, e.g.,
Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis:
Subprime Loans Labeled 'Affordable', WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at Al ("In 2004, as regulators
warned that subprime lenders were saddling borrowers with mortgages they could not afford, the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development helped fuel more ofthat risky lending.").
11. See, e.g.,
Masters & Scholtes, supra note 10 ("The recent rapid expansion of the
subprime market was clearly accompanied by deterioration in underwriting standards.").
12. Id.
13. See Goldstein & Hall, supra note 10.
14. See, e.g.,
Gretchen Morgenson, Can These Mortgages Be Saved?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2007, atB1 (reporting that in August 2007, foreclosure filings "soared to almost 244,000, up 36
percent from the previous month and more than double the number in August 2006").
15. See, e.g.,
Ctr. for Responsible Lending, supra note 7 ("Because lenders used artificially
low initial payments and passed the loans onto investors while hiding the disastrous consequences
coming down the line, many borrowers found themselves in loans that were ultimately
unaffordable.").
16. See id.
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borrowers could not refinance their way out of trouble.' 7 Lenders began
foreclosing, and properties did not sell well-or eventually at all-in the
depressed and saturated market. Payments to bondholders were interrupted,
values of the bonds in markets plunged out of fear of problems with the
underlying mortgages, investors experienced sharp declines in the value of their
mortgage bond holdings, bond issuers were under pressure, and credit-default
swap guarantors lacked adequate cash to pay off the claims for the many
defaulted bonds.' 8 Also, mortgage lending and secondary market transactions
effectively stopped. 19 The crisis then rippled from the secondary mortgage
markets20 to the broader financial sector, and from the United States to the
world.
Commentators, polemicists, and politicians are already arguing over whom
or what should be held responsible for the mortgage and secondary market
crisis. We have heard various-and sometimes competing-theories:
"deregulation" 2 1 and "too much regulation;" 2 2 "greed,"

23

"irresponsibility"-if

not fraud-by many who were involved 24 (perhaps mortgage brokers,
borrowers, lenders, "Wall Street," investors, and rating agencies); too much

17. Anthony Lendez & David Hille, Is There a Legal Defense to the Mortgage Mess?:
LitigationArisingfrom the Subprime Market Collapse Will Hinge on Lenders 'Good Faith, NAT'L
L.J.,
Apr. 21, 2008, atSI, S7.
18. See Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Biggest Insurer's Crisis, a Blind Eye to a Web of Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at Al; Mary Williams Walsh, Insurance on Lehman Debt isthe
Industry's Next Test, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, atB1.
19. See, e.g.,
Bob Tedeschi, Ripples from the Subprime Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007,
§ 11, at 13 ("The subprime mortgage industry... ha[s] either stopped lending or has limited the
conditions under which they will lend to subprime borrowers.").
20. See, e.g.,
Mark Landler, Deutsche Bank Posts Quarterly Loss, Evidence of the Reach of
the FinancialCrisis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, atCIO ("Deutsche Bank's loss, analysts say,
is ...a sign of how far the financial crisis has spread beyond its roots in the American mortgage
market.").
21. See, e.g.,
Adam Nagourney, Economic Woes Set Tone for Rivals in 2nd Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, atAl (quoting President Barack Obama, "'Let's, first of all, understand that
the biggest problem in this whole process was the deregulation of the financial system. "').
22. See, e.g.,
Floyd Norris, Proceed With Care, Mr. Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at
BI ("[T]here may well have been too much regulation of some markets and some activities of
financial institutions-regulation that encouraged and accelerated the growth of a parallel
unregulated financial system.").
23. See, e.g.,
David Stout, "HeadedOut of Town," Bush Turns Reflective, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2008, at A32 (discussing President Obama's "assertions that 'Bush deregulation' had led to a
culture of recklessness and greed on Wall Street.").
24. See, e.g.,
Andrew E. Kramer, Moscow Says U.S. Leadership Era isEnding, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2008, at A6 ("Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin made a speech about what he called
American financial 'irresponsibility' on Wednesday, blaming non-Russian causes for Russia's
stock plunge of more than 50 percent.").
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money chasing too few good deals 25 (with the result that poor mortgage
26
investments were sold and bought); "predatory" business practices by lenders;
and on and on. Historians and economists will eventually weigh in with more
sober and long-term views. However, government officials, legislators, judges,
and market participants are making decisions daily based on their best
conceptions of reality.
There have been bipartisan calls for increased regulation of the markets.
The great unknowns, of course, are the terms and the nature of the regulation.
Care must be taken to correct the abuses but not to choke the functioning of the
markets. Furthermore, some solutions must be left to the markets themselves.
Let me suggest some factors that must be on the table in the search for a
solution:
Secondary Market. The secondary market for mortgages has generated
capital for residential as well as commercial mortgages in areas of the United
States lacking
funding
and has provided a market mechanism for
• • adequate local
•
28
efficient capital transactions. Funding through the secondary market has
enabled first time buyers to acquire homes. This beneficial mechanism needs to
be preserved.
Globalization. Mortgage capital markets have become global and
interconnected. We cannot and should not want to turn back the clock on this
reality. Globalization can bring great benefits, though it also brings risk. This
dynamic must be understood.

25. See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig, AIG to Pay Millions to Top Workers, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,
2008, at DI ("AIG's troubles stem from bad bets it made guaranteeing and buying risky mortgage
investments.").
26. See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Stephen Labaton, A Deregulator Looks Back, Unswayed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, at A] ("[Former senator Phil Gramm] led the effort to block measures
curtailing deceptive or predatory lending, which was just beginning to result in a jump in home
foreclosures that would undermine the financial markets.").
27. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Both Sides of the Aisle See More Regulation, and Not Just of
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2008, at A15 ("Democrats, who typically have been on the defensive
in recent decades as the more pro-regulatory party, now are playing offense.... Yet Republicans,
led by Mr. McCain, are promising that they, too, will support toughened government
regulations."); Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse: Deregulation
Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at Al (quoting Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Christopher Cox, "'The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary
regulation does not work."').
28. See Edward L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affecting Mortgage
Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 501 (1989) ("[M]ore efficient means have been
developed to assist private issuers in placing their mortgage securities in the secondary market.");
David Alan Richards, "Gradable and Tradable": The Securiti ation of Commercial Real Estate
Mortgages, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 99, 103 (1987) ("The residential secondary mortgage market... has
two main functions: (1) redirecting capital within the traditional housing finance system, and (2)
shifting capital from the general capital market to the housing finance system.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss3/7

6

Korngold: Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and Mor

2009]

LEGAL AND POLICY CHOICES

Fraud and Predatory Lending. Regulation, legislative and political
doctrines imposing liability, and criminal sanctions to counteract fraud in the
marketplace should be aggressively used. Fraud is antithetical to the contracting
paradigm and destroys the premise and efficiency of the markets.2 9 Conflicts of
interest, such as when bond issuers pay fees to supposedly neutral rating
agencies, must be addressed. Moreover, predatory lending laws need to be
enforced and, where appropriate, expanded.
Personal Responsibility v. Paternalism. The right balance must be struck
between personal responsibility and benevolent paternalism in adjudicating
particular disputes and also in setting the ground rules for the overall system.
This is a tricky task as there are strong views, many variables, and numerous
individual players that these concepts affect. Society also has a stake because, as
a group, we may not wish to tolerate the cost and fallout of an unregulated
market system, even if some individuals may be willing. And, there is the moral
hazard of bailouts, present and future, that may encourage undesirable actions
by market participants at all levels. Consider these examples: How would an
outright ban on subprime mortgages affect those with poor credit histories who
could only qualify for a nonconventional mortgage and who have been
successful in paying off the mortgages and thus acquiring a first home? 31 Or, if
the premise of hedge funds is that they are for high net worth individuals who
can afford to make riskier investments for a higher reward, can we justify
bailouts-and on what terms-of such entities because of the national interest
in the banking system?
Government, Markets, and Federalism. Some longstanding philosophical
questions will have real world consequences: What should be subject to
government regulation as opposed to market discipline? Is market regulation a

29. See, e.g, David Cho, Housing Boom Tied to Sham Mortgages: Lax Lending Aided Real
Estate Fraud,WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2007, at Al ("Using inflated appraisals and other doctored
papers... [s]ome home prices were inflated by 100 percent or more.").
30. For discussions on predatory lending issues, see generally In re First Alliance Mortgage
Co., 471 F.3d 977, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding class-wide fraud by a bankrupt subprime
lender); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1317-66 (2002) (suggesting that the
doctrine of "suitability" be imported into the law of predatory lending); David Reiss, Subprime
Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the Secondary
Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1023-53 (2006) (outlining existing remedies for
predatory lending); Joshua Michael Stolly, Comment, Subprime Lending: Ohioans Fall Prey to
Predatory Lending at Record Levels What Next?, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 289, 299-309 (2008)
(listing several federal and state responses to predatory lending).
31. For example, a Massachusetts statute does not ban subprime loans but requires the
borrower to receive counseling from a certified third party as to the advisability ofthe loan. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 17B 1/2 (West Supp. 2008).
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federal matter, a state matter, or both? From where should reforms come-the
legislature, the administrative agencies, or the courts?
Racial Discrimination. Racial minorities received a disproportionate
number of subprime loans-compared to conventional loans-which has had a
devastating effect on minority and inner-city communities.32 Courts33 and
legislators will need to address discrimination in lending decisions. Moreover,
the negative impact of subprime lending on particular neighborhoods and
communities will require comprehensive legislative and regulatory responses.
The FederalGovernment. What is the role of the federal government in the
housing market, especially after the conservatorship of Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac)? Is the government the home lender of last resort?
What are the costs and benefits of that status? How will this work? Will this be
better than the confused, ambiguous role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preconservatorship, where the companies had the dual loyalty of serving their
shareholders and the public and where the extent of the federal "guarantee" of
their activity was opaque? And, of course, how will the government buyout of
poorly performing mortgage securities work out?
Intermediation. There were many intermediaries involved in the secondary
market process-mortgage brokers, local lenders, regional lenders, investment
bankers, rating agencies, servicers, mortgage purchasers, mortgage
repurchasers, and so on. Moreover, loans were sliced and repackaged into
different tranches, splitting apart various rights of the mortgage. To the extent
that intermediation has served to insulate players from responsibility or to
obscure liability for their actions, legislation and regulation is needed. The
complexity of the instruments, with buyers not knowing what they were getting,
also led to bad business decisions. The market is now punishing the "smartest34
guys in the room" who failed to declare that the emperor had no clothes.
Borrowers and investors need to better understand the costs and benefits of the

32. See, e.g.,
GREGORY D. SQUIRES, ECON. POLICY INST., Do SUBPRIME LOANS CREATE
SUBPRIME CITIES?: SURGING INEQUALITY AND THE RISE OF PREDATORY LENDING 4 (2008),

http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp197/bp197.pdf (stating that people of color have been
disproportionally represented in the subprime market as opposed to the conventional mortgage
market).
33. See, e.g.,
M & T Mortgage Corp. v. Foy, 858 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (Sup. CE 2008)
(holding that a mortgage creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination when itcarries an
interest rate exceeding 9% and is granted to a minority buyer for the purchase of property in a
minority area).
34. See, e.g.,
Peter S. Goodman, The Free Market: A False Idol After All?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2007, § 4, at4 (describing banks "who, only a year ago, were being lauded for creativity,"
but who are now "writ[ing] off vast sums of money"); Nelson D. Schwartz, Uncharted Territory
Led to a New Kind of Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, atC6 (stating that traders "may not have
fully understood what they owned and traded").
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intermediated system-the possible upshot may be the market alternative of
disintermediated and less opaque loans.
Home Ownership. Home ownership has long been a part of the American
dream. Is this ideal still valid today? 35 How can this be achieved most fairly and
efficiently? What is the role of the individual and government in making this
ideal a reality?
Risk Shifting. The market systems for spreading the risk of default on
mortgage instruments did not work. The role, independence, and judgment of
rating agencies blessing mortgage securities need close study and action. Creditdefault swaps have been cited as a major cause of the financial crisis. 3 6 Through
credit-default swaps, Congress permitted AIG and others, in essence, to
guarantee mortgage bonds without reserves, disclosure, or regulation (and also
to guarantee them to non-holders who were simply betting on default of a bond
that they did not actually hold). Credit-default swaps did not shift the risk
within the market; instead, the taxpayers are paying the bill.
These issues present a large and complicated agenda for legislatures,
regulators, courts, and markets as they shape the future of financial markets.
Moreover, the policy factors discussed above should also influence the
legislatures and the courts that make decisions on the law of mortgages in the
aftermath of the mortgage financing crisis of 2008-this is the subject of Part
III.
III.

THE LAW OF MORTGAGES

The aftermath of the financial crisis and the collapse of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac could well affect the law of mortgages in various states. Structural
changes in the mortgage industry and possible legislative, regulatory, and

35. See, e.g., Gerald Korngold, Resolving the IntergenerationalConflicts of Real Property
Law: Preserving Free Markets and PersonalAutonomy for Future Generations,56 AM. U. L. REV.
1525, 1536-37 (2007) ("[T]here is a serious threat that home ownership, even rental housing, has
become unaffordable for significant segments of our society, placing this facet of the American
dream beyond the reach of too many .... "). But see Kristen David Adams, Homeownership:
American Dream or illusion of Empowerment, 60 S.C. L. REV. 573 (2009) (questioning whether
American's overvalue the "illusion" of homeownership).
36. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Names Insider to Commodities Post, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at B3 ("[C]redit-default swaps .. greatly aggravated the damage caused by
the subprime mortgage meltdown.").
37. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 barred federal and state regulation
of credit default swaps. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at scattered
sections of 7, 15, and 26 U.S.C.). For criticisms of this vehicle, see Hannah Fairfield, A Snarl of
Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at B9 ("This is the first crisis since the 1987 market
crash ... exposing regulatory redundancies and enormous gaps, like a lack of oversight for some
derivatives and credit default swaps.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60: 727

judicial responses may alter two key trends that have developed over the past
decade or two-the nationalization of mortgage law and the modernization of
the law of mortgages.
A.

Nationalizationand Standardization

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as they existed prior to the federal
conservatorship on September 7, 2008,38 helped to bring about a degree of
nationalization and standardization of mortgage law. 39 Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac were successful through market power, while attempts at state-based
uniform legislation failed.
1.

Uniform Laws

Before Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac assumed a major role in
standardization, lenders, counsel, and law reformers attempted to create an
40
analog to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) for real estate mortgages.
This movement manifested itself in the adoption of the Uniform Land
Transactions Act (ULTA) by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1975.41 No state ever adopted ULTA. 42 In
1985 the NCCUSL adopted the mortgage portions of ULTA as the separate
Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA). 43 No state subsequently adopted

38. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Sec'y of Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M.
Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets
and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp I 129.htm.
39. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (which became law on July 30, 2008)
empowered the eventual takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by the Department of the
Treasury. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (amending scattered sections of 5, 12, and 15
U.S.C.). For codification ofthe statute originally authorizing Fannie Mae, see 12 U.S.C. § 1717
(2006).
40.

UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT, prefatory note (withdrawn 1999), 7A (pt. 2) U.L.A.

244 (2006).
41. Id.; UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT (1975) (amended 1977), 13 (pt. 2) U.L.A. 160
(2002).
42. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in the Bankruptcy
Courts: Implicationsfor Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1461,
1540 n.265 (1993).
43. UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT, prefatory note (withdrawn 1999), 7A (pt. 2) U.L.A.
244 (2006); see generally Norman Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: The Uniform Land
Security Interest Act, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 289, 307-08 (1995) (providing background
information on the ULSIA); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The Future of American Real Estate Law:
Uniform Foreclosure Laws and Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1109, 1110
n.1 (1996) (same).
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the ULSA.44 These model statutes were intended to provide a uniform national
law for mortgages, reduce the transaction costs for the flow of capital across
state lines, encourage the primary and secondary mortgage markets, and
modernize the law. Less expensive loans would benefit borrowers, and
efficient allocation of capital would be a social good.
Unlike the UCC, however, the uniform real estate acts were unsuccessful.
The failure of these real estate statutes may have been due to the uniquely local
and fixed nature of the asset, the power of local counsel unwilling to relinquish
control over state real estate transactions to national players, a preference for the
general reliability of existing mortgage law over an untried substitute, an
unclear showing of the benefits of a standardized law, or other factors. 46 In any
event, legislative attempts47 at creating a uniform law of mortgages among the
states have been a failure.
2.

FannieMae and Freddie Mac

Through their dominant role in the secondary market, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac helped to bring significant uniformity to the law of mortgages in
various states, accomplishing some of what the uniform law mechanism was
unable to do. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac promulgated form notes, mortgages,
and deeds of trust to simplify reviewing, buying, packaging, and selling
mortgages. 48 The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac forms became the gold standard
for residential loans across the country because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
required these in order for a mortgage to be bundled into a Fannie Mae or a
Freddie Mac program. 49 Thus, through their power over the secondary market,

44. Randolph, supra note 43, at 1110 n.2.
45. UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT, prefatory note (withdrawn 1999), 7A (pt. 2) U.L.A.
244 (2006).
46. See, e.g., Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Wasted Days and Wasted Nights: Why the Land Acts
Failed, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1037, 1052-60 (1996) (discussing the reasons that states failed to adopt
the uniform real estate acts); Ronald Benton Brown, Whatever Happened to the Uniform Land
TransactionsAct?, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1017, 1018-19 (1996) (listing the "Top Ten Reasons for the
Demise ofthe ULTA").
47.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES (1997) (providing a modern guide

to courts on the law of mortgages and choosing between competing rules where there is a conflict).
48. See, e.g., Andrew Lance, Balancing Private and Public Initiatives in the MortgageBacked Security Market, 18 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 426, 438 (1983) ("[Fannie Mae] prescribes
operating standards for private mortgage insurers of pools at the same time that it and other
agencies ofthe federal government are creating and insuring pools which compete with the private
pools."). For sample Fannie Mae mortgages, see Legal Documents-Security Instruments,
https://www. efanniemae. com/sf/formsdocs/documents/secinstruments/index.jsp#standard
(last
visited Mar. 25, 2009).
49. See generally D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS
(1989) (discussing the residential note and mortgage forms used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).
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residential borrowers were essentially forced to "agree" to the Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac terms. Through "consent," the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
documents set the terms of the mortgage. These terms sometimes trump the
ability of lenders to insert contrary terms into the instrument that would
otherwise be enforceable under state law; on other matters, the forms provide a
"consensual" right that the courts of a particular state would not have found. For
example, the Fannie Mae form note allows prepayment of the mortgage without
penalty; 50 without that Fannie Mae (and Freddie Mac) provision, many states
would not permit prepayment as a matter of law.'
However, the requirements of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac forms
significantly reduced bargaining by the lender and the borrower, taking terms
off the table. Therefore, at least theoretically, uniformity reduced the choice of
market terms for the players. As a corollary, the work of attorneys representing
residential borrowers and lenders became largely commoditized, with little left
to negotiate. Costs of a deal were lowered, but the ability to represent clients
fully was also compromised. Moreover, from a system perspective, it has been
argued that uniformity can lead to the loss of the benefits of a federalist system
where different states are permitted to make rules that best reflect regional
preferences;5 2 the experimentation
among different states can lead to innovation
53
..
adopted by others. Finally, if there is to be federal preemption of mortgage
law, it might be better accomplished more transparently through congressional
study and action. 4
The uniformity of residential mortgages in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
pools served to lower transaction costs and bring other benefits of
standardization, as well as to resolve or reverse by agreement certain issues in
state law. So, what will happen to these mortgage documents and accompanying

50. Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac, Uniform Instrument Form 3200, Multistate Fixed Rate Note
(Single Family), available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/notes/
pdf/3200.pdf
51. Compare Clover Square Assocs. v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 674 F. Supp. 1137, 1138-39
(D.N.J. 1987) (finding no right to prepay as a matter of law), aff'd, 869 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1989)
with Hatcher v. Rose, 407 S.E.2d 172, 177 (N.C. 1991) (presuming a right to prepay), and
Mahoney v. Furches, 468 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 1983) (same).
52. Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the
1990s and the Implications of Changing FinancialMarkets, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1261, 1299-1300
(1991).
53. Id. at 1287.
54. For examples of federal preemption through congressional action, see Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2006) (preempting state law that barred
"due-on-sale clause[s]" in mortgages); the Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1981, 12
U.S.C. §§ 3701-3717 (creating a "uniform Federal foreclosure remedy for multifamily
mortgages"); and the Single Family Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1994, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3751-3768
(permitting power of sale foreclosure with HUD mortgages).
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac regulations post-conservatorship? Will there
continue to be uniformity, with its advantages? Or, will more terms now be
subject to negotiation, with the arguable benefits and clear costs? Will Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac continue to trump state mortgage law via the terms of
their documents, or will they take a more laissez-faire attitude? Will consumer
protection be a concern (prepayment provisions favored consumers, at least in
the short run)? All of these questions will be answered in the period going
forward.
B. Modernization
In recent years there have been important steps taken to modernize
mortgage creation, transfer, and recording. The growth in the secondary markets
spurred a number of these changes. Legislatures and courts need to address the
problems that the subprime crisis and mortgage market collapse engendered. At
the same time, they should be careful to preserve the positive changes in the law
of mortgages that the secondary market has brought. Decisionmakers,
moreover, have an opportunity to advance further modernization by altering
rules of state mortgage law to ensure the fair and efficient transfer of notes and
mortgages on the secondary market.
1. From Twigs to Bytes
It has taken centuries for our current law of mortgages and recorded
documents to evolve.55 We all remember from our IL Property course that, until
the sixteenth century, land could only be transferred by the process of livery of
seisin. 56 This process required the grantor and the grantee to go to the property
being conveyed, where the grantor had to declare the prescribed words of
transfer and hand the grantee a twig or other physical manifestation of the
land.57 Only with the Statute of Uses of 1536 could grantors transfer land by
document without going to the property.58 This was an important milestone in
the process of converting land from feudal property to a commercial asset that
could be bought and sold easily in the marketplace. Another milestone was the
passage of the recording acts at the dawn of the American republic, which
allowed buyers of interests in real property to trade in confidence and

55. See generally Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72
MO. L. REV. 1031, 1031-35 (2007) (discussing the evolution of real estate law).
56. A. JAMES CASNER, W. BARTON LEACH, SUSAN FLETCHER FRENCH,
KORNGOLD & LEA VANDERVELDE, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 316 (5th ed. 2004).

57.
58.

GERALD

Id.
Id.
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encouraged markets for sales and financing.5 9 In the twentieth century,
recording offices made a major shift6 from hand copying instruments into the
records to storing them on microfilm. 0
Yet this was still a paper-based system, one built for a vision of land as a
local asset involving local players. Two recent, revolutionary trends pushed
for changes in this old system. First, there was the explosion of the Information
Age and the opportunity to employ modern computer technology to make the
recording system more efficient, more transparent, and less costly. 62 Second,
globalization of capital permitted the funneling
of funds to American localities
63
through the work of the secondary market.
For example, forty-six states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),
making electronic signatures
64
equivalent to signatures on paper documents. Eighteen states and the District
of Columbia have adopted the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act

59. See, e.g.,
Korngold, supra note 35, at 1535 ("[T]he creation of the recording system
[allowed] buyers [to] pay in confidence [because] they would receive good title
and streamlined
forms of deeds ....
") (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 27, 17375 (3d ed. 2005)).
60. Arthur A. Gaudio, Electronic Real Estate Records: A Model for Action, 24 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 271, 273 (2002).
61. See id.
62. See, e.g.,
Sam Stonefield, Electronic Real Estate Documents: Context, Unresolved CostBenefit Issues and a Recommended Decisional Process,24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 205, 228 (2002)
("The use of electronic documents in real estate transactions will produce efficiencies and
enhancements that will yield both direct and indirect economic benefits, as well as important
public policy gains for public land records.").
63. See, e.g.,
David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1028
(2008) ("These two companies were unlike nearly all other financial institutions in the 1970s in
that their businesses were not geographically restricted and they could develop a truly national
market for mortgages.") (citing THOMAS H. STANTON, DEVISING AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR SUPERVISING THE PUBLIC BENEFITS AND PUBLIC COSTS OF GOVERNMENT

SPONSORED ENTERPRISES 2-3 (1999); Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on
Real Estate Law and Practice, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 270 (1999) ("Issuers of mortgagebacked securities pool hundreds of loans together, obtain credit enhancement, usually in the form
of guarantees, from a secondary market agency and sell their interests in the pool of mortgages to
investors.")).
64. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). In 2000, Congress passed the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESIGN). Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Star. 464
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). ESIGN provides similar but more limited recognitions
of electronic documents than the UETA. See, e.g.,
David E. Ewan & Mark Ladd, Race to the
(Virtual) Courthouse: How Standards Drive Electronic Recording of Real Property Documents,
PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 2008, at 8, 11 ("The federal ESIGN Act adds some documents to its
exclusion section that UETA does not.").
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(URPERA), approved by the NCCUSL, in 2004. URPERA provides that
electronic documents satisfy recording requirements, that electronic signatures
and notary acknowledgements are valid, and that recorders must accept
electronic documents for recording and indexing.6 6 Electronic recording and
indexing might well lead to redefinition of century-old rules of search and
constructive notice because the information is more easily accessible
to
67
searchers and there is less need to limit searches because of expense.
2.

Mortgage Electronic RegistrationSystems, Inc. (MERS)

Another recent development is the Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (MERS) for residential mortgages and related documents. In
1993, the Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), the Federal Housing
Administration, and the Department of Veterans Affairs created MERS. U°
MERS provides
,,69 "electronic processing and tracking of [mortgage] ownership
and transfers.
Mortgage lenders, banks, insurance companies, and title
companies become members of MERS and pay an annual fee.7 0 They appoint
7
MERS as their agent to act on all mortgages that they register on the system. 1

65. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About
The Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/
uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-urpera.asp (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009).
66. For a discussion of digital recording, see David E. Ewan etal., It's the Message, Not the
Medium!: Electronic Record and Electronic Signature Rules Preserve Existing Focus of the Law
on Content, Not Medium of Recorded Land Title Instruments, 60 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1502-05 (2005)
(discussing the interplay between UETA and URPERA); Gaudio, supra note 60, at 275-84
(providing a model structure for an electronic land recording system); Stonefield, supra note 62, at
237-43 (recommending the creation of task forces to stimulate the transition to electronic real
estate documents); Dale A. Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic
Recording Act, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245, 259-68 (2002) (suggesting the elements that should
be included in a uniform recording act); Dale A. Whitman, Digital Recording of Real Estate
Conveyances, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 227, 264-66 (1999) (calling for the NCCUSL to adopt a
uniform digital recording statute).
67. See, e.g.,
First Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Sherwood, 817 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. CE 2003)
(suggesting that because computerization lessens the burden of document searches, purchasers may
be required to look beyond the index to conduct a diligent search), rev 'd, 879 A.2d 178, 182 (Pa.
2005) (holding that constructive notice exists where a mortgage is properly recorded even if the
mortgage is improperly indexed).
68. MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 83 n.2 (N.Y. 2006); Phyllis K. Slesinger
& Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 805, 807
(1995); Brenda M. Williamson, New York's Highest Court Requires County Clerks to Record
MERS Mortgages,Assignments, and Discharges,35 REAL EST. REV. 5 (2007).
69. MERSCORP, Inc.,
861 N.E.2d at83.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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A MERS mortgage is recorded with the particular county's office of the
recorder with "'Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc.' named as the
lender's nominee or mortgagee of record" on the mortgage.7 2 The MERS
member who owns the beneficial interest may assign those beneficial ownership
'73
rights or servicing rights to another MERS member. These assignments are
not part 74of the public record, but
.. are tracked electronically on MERS's private
records . Mortgagors are notified
of transfers of servicing rights, but not of
75
transfers of beneficial ownership.
MERS facilitates an efficient secondary market in mortgages by allowing
76
the easy transfer of beneficial rights. After the initial recording in the local
clerk's office, subsequent transactions can be done quickly at a low cost from a
central location utilizing modern technology without the need for local
recording of paper assignment documents.77 Such a process facilitates the flow
of global capital, bringing investment funds into areas without local mortgage
financing. Potential homeowners, as well as those seeking the most favorable
rates, can benefit from MERS.
Unfortunately, some judicial decisions during the recent spike in subprime
and conventional foreclosures have questioned MERS.78 Consider, for example,
the September 2008 case Landmark National Bank v. Kesler,79 decided by the
Kansas Court of Appeals. That case involved the foreclosure of a first mortgage
by Landmark National Bank (Landmark) where there was also a second
mortgage given by the borrower to secure a loan from Millenia Mortgage
Corporation (Millenia). 80 The second mortgage showed the MERS entity
(MERS, Inc.) as the mortgagee "solely as nominee for Lender."' Millenia then
assigned its interest to Sovereign Bank. 82 When Landmark, the first mortgagee,
foreclosed, it did not join MERS, Inc in the action. 8 3 After foreclosure was
entered, MERS, Inc. sought to overturn the foreclosure, claiming that it was a
necessary party that Landmark did not join. 84 The Kansas Court of Appeals

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra note 68, at811.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g.,
MERSCORP, Inc.,
861 N.E.2d at 85 (requiring county clerks to record
mortgages, assignments, and discharges where the MERS entity was listed as the mortgagee).
79. 192 P.3d 177 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
80. Id.at178.
81. Id.at179.
82. Id.at178-79.
83. See id.at179.
84. Id.
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rejected this claim. 85 It noted that MERS, Inc. was simply an agent of the
lender, did not hold title to the loan, and did not even service the mortgage.86
Results such as that in Kesler would devastate the effectiveness of MERS.87
Moreover, the Kesler court refused to deal with modern technological and
market realities and with the benefits MERS provides to borrowers and society.
Instead, the court chose to hide behind a narrow approach to the case:
We do not attempt in this opinion to comprehensively determine all
of the rights or duties of MERS as a nominee mortgagee ....
In this
case, we are only required to address whether the failure to name and
serve MERS as a defendant in a foreclosure action in which the lender
of record has been served is such a fatal defect88that the foreclosure
judgment must be set aside. We hold that it is not.
An unarticulated concern over residential owners losing their homes or
hard-pressed borrowers in general may underlie anti-MERS rulings. If so, courts
and legislatures need to address these issues directly. Judicial and legislative
remedies should not be so broad that89 they will destroy the benefits of MERS to
individual borrowers and to society.
3.

Transparency andMarket Efficiency

I have previously written of the importance of transparency in the recording
system. 90 Current and potential participants in land transfer and finance
transactions need information so markets can operate efficiently and fairly, thus
benefiting those particular players as well as society. 9 1 There is therefore a
legitimate concern if unrecorded mortgage assignments in secondary market

85. Id. at 182.
86. Id. at 179.
87. For an example of a court allowing foreclosure by a MERS entity, see Mortgage
ElectronicRegistrationSystems, Inc. v. A i e, 965 So. 2d 151, 152 (Fla. Dist. CE App. 2007).
88. Id.at181-82.
89. See, e.g., MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 88 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting in part) ("The benefits ofthe system to MERS members are not insubstantial. Through
use of MERS as nominee, lenders are relieved of the costs of recording each mortgage assignment
with the County Clerk .... [and t]ransfers of mortgage instruments are faster .... ). Decision
makers need to consider whether the government monopoly of the recording system is beneficial
or merely rent-seeking. See id.
90. See Korngold, supra note 35, at 1564.
91. See id. (citing GERALD KORNGOLD & PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND TRANSFER, DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCE 244-45 (4th ed.

2002)).
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transactions are not placed on the public record. 92 In the dissenting opinion in
MERSCORP, Inc., Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals
expressed a concern that MERS only discloses the current servicer and not the
assignee of the mortgage. She wrote:
The lack of disclosure may create substantial difficulty when a
homeowner wishes to negotiate the terms of his or her mortgage or
enforce a legal right against the mortgagee and is unable to learn the
mortgagee's identity. Public records will no longer contain this
information as, if it achieves the success it envisions, the MERS system
will render the public record useless by masking beneficial ownership
of mortgages and eliminating records of assignments altogether. Not
only will this information deficit detract from the amount of public data
accessible for research and monitoring of industry trends, but it may
also function, perhaps unintentionally, to insulate a noteholder
93 from
liability, mask lender error and hide predatory lending practices.
Actually, this is an issue that predates MERS, and is reflected in the holder
in due course doctrine of the law of negotiable instruments. Some background is
necessary for an understanding of the issue and the policy choices that are
implicated today as we reevaluate the rules governing secondary market
mortgages. There are three lessons that our experience with the law of
negotiable instruments can impart to our approach to secondary market
assignments.
The modern law of negotiable instruments developed in the eighteenth
century to reflect changes and aspirations in the world's trade and monetary
systems. 94 In order to make notes the equivalent of cash-a step necessary to
increase commerce and general well being-certain traditional claims and
defenses against holders in due course for the payment of negotiable notes were
relaxed. 95 At the same time, protections were retained to deny payment to the
holder in due course in cases of fraud of which the holder should have been

92. See, e.g.,
Nosek v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. (In re Nosek), 386 B.R. 374, 385 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 2008) (imposing a sanction upon the mortgagee for attempting "to jettison the obligation
to be forthright and diligent with the Court and the Debtor" by hiding behind itsservicing
agreement).
93. MERSCORP, Inc., 861 N.E.2d at 88 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting in part).
94. See, e.g.,
Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form
over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 366-74 (2002) (offering
alternative narratives as well).
95. See, e.g.,
U.C.C. § 3-305 (2002) (stating that a holder in due course takes an instrument
free from all claims and many defenses). See generally KORNGOLD & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 91
(providing an overview ofthe holder in due course doctrine).
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aware. The English courts and then the American legislatures accepted this
trade-off in order to accomplish social goals. 97 This is the first lesson for today
from our history with the holder in due course doctrine: rules must be crafted to
meet commercial realities and social needs.
The holder in due course rule is attractive to purchasers of loans in the
secondary market because it makes the notes more equivalent to cash and
reduces legal impediments to collection. 98 But some of the requirements to
become a holder in due course, such as the need to take physical possession of
the note, may no longer be viable in secondary markets.
Notes are assigned
often and through various intermediaries; there are business, speed, and
environmental reasons for paperless transactions in our digital world. This is the
second lesson: we need to develop a set of rules that meets the twenty-first
century commercial practices of lenders who take advantage of the
technological revolution. At the same time, the system must make the
ownership of mortgage rights transparent so that these interests can be bought
and sold in markets. It appears that in the run-up to the recent financial crisis,
major institutions did not know what financial instruments they owned, let alone
what instruments potential trade partners held. 100
The third lesson is that the holder in due course doctrine may no longer be
suitable for borrowers in a modern era and may require adjustments to protect
borrowers. Under traditional law, there is no requirement for the holder in due
course or original lender to give notice to the borrower of an assignment from
the lender to the holder in due course. 101 The assignment of the mortgage need

96. See, e.g.,
U.S. Fin. Co. v. Jones, 229 So. 2d 495, 497-98 (Ala. 1969) (denying holder in
due course status because the purchaser had notice of transferor's past practice of fraudulent
loans); U.C.C. § 3-302 (2002) (stating that to be a holder in due course, the transferee must, among
other things, acquire a negotiable note in good faith and without notice of defenses); U.C.C. § 3305 (allowing a defense of fraud against a holder in due course).
97. See, e.g.,
Eggert, supra note 94, at 376 (noting that one such social goal in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was "to create a currency substitute," which was greatly
needed atthat time).
98. See, e.g.,
id.("Another function of the holder in due course doctrine was to make
negotiable instruments more easily transferrable by removing a great barrier to their transferability,
the fear that the maker of a note will have a defense to it.").
99. See, e.g.,
Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securiti ation, and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 566 (2002) ("Some have argued
that the advent of securitization has effectively eliminated the holder in due course doctrine, stating
that the process of indorsing each of the hundreds or thousands of notes that make up a mortgage
pool would be so time consuming as to be impractical.").
100. See, e.g.,
Drew DeSilver, Big Dreams of WaMu Dashed by Risky Loans, SEATTLE
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008 ("[M]ortgage-backed securities[] were sliced up, repackaged and resold so
many times that, as often as not, institutional investors weren't sure entirely what they owned.").
101. 13 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 104.10(b)(5), at 633 (David
A. Thomas ed., 1994).
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not be recorded, 10 2 and in any case a recording would only give notice if the
borrower checked the record on a daily basis (a significant burden). Despite the
lack of notice regarding the transfer of the note and mortgage, if the borrower
then pays the original lender, the law will still require the borrower to pay the
holder in due course. 10 3 Because mortgages are now so commonly and
repeatedly assigned on the secondary market, 04 this puts borrowers at risk of
having to pay twice. 0 5 The law could alleviate this risk, however, by simply
holding that the borrower can pay the original lender until the borrower receives
notice of the assignment.l16 Thus, even without MERS and Chief Judge Kaye's
objections, there is a problem for borrowers with the lack of transparency
regarding the transfers of notes and mortgages.
Transparency is not the only issue, however, that needs attention. First,
where there are multiple owners of an interest, it may be unclear who has the
authority to modify 7the instrument and arrive at a workout of a troubled loan
with the borrower. Even if the servicing agreement empowers the servicer to
do workouts, servicers may refuse to do so out of fear that beneficial owners of
the mortgage may second-guess the modification decision and attempt to hold
the servicer liable for deviating from the initial note.10 8 Moreover, transaction
costs may also
09 increase
... in order to track holders in due course and to arrive at
agreements.
Additionally, holder in due course immunity should not extend
to predatory lending activities by the original lender if the assignee-usin
ordinary due diligence-knew or should have known about such activities.
Hopefully, our decisionmakers can find a way to protect the benefits of the
secondary market but also the expectation of fairness of borrowers in the postsubprime bust era.

102. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Records and Recording Laws § 50 (2001) (citing Nat'l Live Stock
Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 203 U.S. 296, 310 (1906)).
103. 13 THOMPSON, supra note 101.
104. See, e.g., Schill, supra note 63, at 271 ("The growth of residential mortgage-backed
securities has been phenomenal.").
105. 13 THOMPSON, supra note 101.
106. The Restatement adopts this position. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES
§ 5.5 (1997). Requiring the lender to produce the note before the borrower makes a payment would
protect the borrower (and may have been adequate protection in an earlier period), but the
requirement is impractical in modern borrowing transactions where payments are sent monthly by
mail. See id. cmt. a.
107. See Eggert, supra note 99, at 562-63; Gretchen Morgenson, Work out Problems with
Lenders? Try to Find Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at A14.
108. See Eggert, supra note 99, at 560-61.
109. Id. at561.
110. Cf Doyle v. Resolution Trust Corp., 999 F.2d 469, 473 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that a
purchaser who takes an instrument in good faith and without notice of the unauthorized alteration
is entitled to holder in due course status).
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4.

ForeclosureProceedings

Courts have also responded to the current financial crisis by using technical
rules of foreclosure to protect mortgagors where the underlying note and
mortgage have been assigned. " In an opinion that received much attention,112
Federal District Court Judge Christopher A. Boyko of the Northern District of
Ohio denied Deutsche Bank National Trust Company's foreclosure of fourteen
mortgages that it owned by assignment. 113 The court held that a copy of the
executed assignment of the note and mortgage was required to be attached to
the complaint in order for the court to have jurisdiction. 114 Apparently the
documents were not available because the sale of the note and mortgage was
made without such documentation in a secondary market transaction.
The
court was unimpressed with explanations that the secondary market did not
allow for strict compliance with conveyancing formalities:
Neither the fluidity of the secondary mortgage market, nor monetary or
economic considerations of the parties, nor the convenience of the
litigants supersede those obligations.
Plaintiffs, "Judge, you just don't understand how things work,"
argument reveals a condescending mindset and quasi-monopolistic
system where financial institutions have traditionally controlled, and
still control, the foreclosure process.116
Judge Boyko further asserted that while increasing the fluidity of the market and
securitization was worth "X dollars," the preservation of
the "jurisdictional
117
integrity of United States District Court [was] [p]riceless."' '
Judge Boyko applied the legal rule to the facts before him in a case dealing
with the loss of property-a constitutionally protected right."18 The problem for

111. See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654-55 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(requiring a recorded copy of the mortgage, all assignments of the mortgage, and an affidavit that
the plaintiff is the owner of the note and mortgage in order to permit foreclosure); Bayview Loan
Servicing, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 890 N.E.2d 940, 943 (11. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that a servicing
company was not the proper plaintiff in the foreclosure of an assigned mortgage).
112. See Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosures Hit a Snag for Lenders, N.Y. TIMES,
November 15, 2008, at C1.
113. In re Foreclosure Cases, No. 1:07-cv-02282, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
31, 2007).
114. Id. at *1.
115. See id.
116. Id. at *2, *3 n.3.
117. Id. at *3 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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lenders is that the rules may not have adequately changed with the times.
Hopefully, as we move past the immediacy of the financial crisis, we can arrive
at legislative and market solutions that not only give us legal rules and
procedures that are both predictable and fair to borrowers, but also reflect
market realities.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS

We are living through unprecedented turmoil in our financial and mortgage
markets. The complete history has yet to be lived, let alone written. But it is
none too early to begin thinking about how we can alter the regulation of
markets and the law of mortgages to ensure a brighter future ahead.
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